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Abstract 
 
Marriage data show a strong degree of positive assortative mating along a variety of 
attributes. But since marriage is an equilibrium outcome, it is unclear whether 
positive sorting is the result of preferences rather than opportunities. We assess the 
relative importance of preferences and opportunities in dating behaviour, using 
unique data from a large commercial speed dating agency. While the speed dating 
design gives us a direct observation of individual preferences, the random allocation 
of participants across events generates an exogenous source of variation in 
opportunities and allows us to identify the role of opportunities separately from that 
of preferences. We find that both women and men equally value physical attributes, 
such as age and weight, and that there is positive sorting along age, height, and 
education. The role of individual preferences, however, is outplayed by that of 
opportunities. Along some attributes (such as occupation, height and smoking) 
opportunities explain almost all the estimated variation in demand. Along other 
attributes (such as age), the role of preferences is more substantial, but never 
dominant. Despite this, preferences have a part when we observe a match, i.e., when 
two individuals propose to one another. 
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1. Introduction 
A long tradition of social research has documented the strong resemblance of traits 
and social status between husbands and wives.1 This positive assortative mating is 
typically explained in term of the preferences of individuals who are choosing one 
another and of the opportunities people have to meet someone of the same status or 
with similar traits.2 For example, individuals may have an intrinsic preference for 
partners with attributes similar to theirs, or, alternatively, they may meet and interact 
more often with people of similar status or with similar interests. Identifying the 
separate influence of preferences and opportunities is important because it provides us 
with clearer insights on mate selection and family formation and enhances our 
understanding of how assortative mating occurs. These, in turn, may give us a finer 
view of marriage and divorce.  
Despite the vast research literature mentioned before, very few studies have 
been able to isolate the influence of individual preferences from that of market 
availability. This is because most of the empirical analysis has been performed on 
data that contain only final matches between females and males (i.e., marriages and 
cohabitations). But a final match is the equilibrium outcome of a process that entails 
meeting and screening a number of potential partners, choosing one of them and, 
crucially, being chosen in return. A final match, therefore, is shaped by the interaction 
between preferences of individuals on both sides of the market (demand) and the 
(un)availability of suitable partners (supply). All these aspects of the search process, 
however, are not collected by standard surveys, and the separate identification of the 
effects of preferences and opportunities is not straightforward.3  
We overcome this shortcoming and analyze the distinct roles of mate demand 
and supply by studying data from a large speed dating agency based and operating in 
the United Kingdom. In this setting, subjects meet potential partners (roughly 23 
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 Early studies on assortative mating date back to Westermarck [1903] and Hamilton [1912]. The 
economics literature, which has grown out of Becker’s [1973, 1974] seminal work, has produced 
models that can generate wide arrays of marital sorting [Lam 1988; Bergstrom and Bagnoli 1993; 
Burdett and Coles 1997; Shimer and Smith 2000; Smith 2006]. Kalmijn [1998], Cooper and Sheldon 
[2002] and Blossfeld and Timm [2003] provide broad surveys of studies by sociologists and 
psychologists.  
2
 In explaining positive sorting, researchers have also stressed the involvement of third parties (such as 
parents and friends), especially along racial and religious lines [Gordon 1964; Kalmijn 1998; and Bisin, 
Topa, and Verdier 2004]. 
3
 At the cost of model-specific functional form identifying restrictions, this can be achieved with the 
estimation of structural parameters of marriage models as in Wong [2003], Bisin, Topa, and Verdier 
[2004], and Choo and Siow [2006].  
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individuals of the opposite sex) for three minutes each and indicate who they want to 
contact again.4 Subjects’ choices in these speed dating sessions constitute real 
behaviour with actual consequences: when two speed daters match, their details are 
given to one another, permitting the arrangement of more traditional dates. The speed 
dating setting offers some of the advantages of a field experiment: participants are 
randomly allocated to a session, have no prior information about the people they meet, 
and can select potential partners only after meeting them.5 Importantly, this design 
gives us direct information on individual revealed preferences (i.e., whether or not 
subjects want to have a future meeting with their potential partners) as well as on the 
specific aspects of each dating session, which we call “market” (e.g., number of 
participants and their average characteristics). 
A small number of recent studies have analyzed mate selection taking 
advantage of the random-experiment setting of speed dating. Kurzban and Weeden 
[2005] use data from HurryDate, a large dating company operating in major 
metropolitan areas in the United States, to investigate the choices that approximately 
2600 subjects make in dating partners. Their main estimates show that female and 
male subjects are equally attracted by physically observable attributes like weight, 
height, and age, and much less so by other attributes such as education and religion. 
They also find small positive assortative patterns along race and height.  
Fisman et al. [2006a] base their experimental design on the HurryDate format 
to analyze a sample of about 400 students at Columbia University, with the objective 
of identifying gender differences in dating preferences. Their results slightly differ 
from those found by Kurzban and Weeden [2005]: only men exhibit a preference for 
physical attractiveness while women respond more to intelligence and race. They too 
find some evidence of positive sorting, with male subjects valuing women’s 
intelligence or ambition only if it does not exceed their own. They also document the 
importance of group size, whereby women (but not men) make significantly fewer 
proposals in larger meetings. In a companion paper using the same data, Fisman et al. 
[2006b] investigate racial preferences in dating and highlight the importance of the 
interplay between preferences and opportunities. Their finding that women have 
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 Throughout the paper, the individual who makes the decision is labelled as “subject” and the 
individual who is decided upon as “partner”.  
5
 In other forms of mediated dating (e.g., personal advertisements and online dating), part of the 
selection process occurs before the first actual (physical) meeting, and is usually based on self-reported 
and not fully verifiable information [Lynn and Shurgot 1984; Hitsch, Hortaçsu, and Ariely 2006]. 
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stronger racial preferences than men is not consistent with the results reported in 
Kurzban and Weeden [2005].  
Hitsch, Hortaçsu, and Ariely [2006] follow a different approach. They use data 
from a large sample of users of a major online dating service in Boston and San Diego 
to analyze how individual characteristics affect the likelihoods of having a personal 
profile browsed, being contacted, and exchanging contact information via e-mail. 
Although online daters do not physically meet, their study confirms some of the 
previous evidence. For example, in line with the results discussed in Fisman et al. 
[2006a], they find that women put more weight on a partner’s income than men do; 
and, consistent with Fisman et al. [2006b], women have a more pronounced 
preference to form a match with men of their own ethnicity.  
Our work makes two substantive contributions. First, we study a larger sample 
of speed daters who have a more diverse set of attributes than those analyzed by 
Fisman et al. [2006a] and make decisions in a real-life environment (and in a different 
country). As advocated by Fisman et al. [2006a, p. 695], this allows us to better 
examine the extent to which women and men differ in their dating preferences.6  
Second, because we have information not only on many speed daters but also 
on a large number of speed dating sessions, we analyze the relative importance of 
individual preferences and market opportunities in explaining the observed patterns of 
mate selection. Knowing this is crucial if we try to unpack why people are more likely 
to form unions within their group (endogamy) or with partners close in status 
(homogamy). For example, our view of the openness of the marriage market and its 
workings would be strikingly different if we knew that the observed patterns of 
positive assortative mating were driven by segregation rather than by individual 
preferences. If endogamy is the result of (missing) opportunities, then residential 
mobility programs like the Gautreaux program in Chicago [Keels et al. 2005], 
universities’ efforts to mix students with different background in classes and dorms 
[Marmaros and Sacerdote 2006], and immigrant dispersion programs such as the 
Swedish refugee placement policy [Edin, Fredriksson, Åslund 2003] may offer 
individuals the possibility to meet (and eventually match with) potential partners from 
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 Since our data set does not contain information on ethnicity, we, unfortunately, cannot draw 
comparisons of results with existing studies along this dimension.  
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diverse groups and with different attributes.7 If, instead, endogamy is the result of 
preferences, policy makers will have less room for redressing the segregation issues 
that arise from mate selection.  
 We emphasize four aspects of our estimation results. First, we find that some 
attributes are valued by everyone. Both women and men put comparable weights on 
easily observable physical attributes: women prefer men who are young and tall, 
while men are more attracted to women who are young and thin.8 In the short span of 
time of a speed dating meeting, physical attributes are arguably easier to assess than 
other attributes, such as education or occupation. In line with the insights developed 
by Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela [2006], socioeconomic characteristics may be more 
costly (or less reliable) signals to use in formulating a proposal. Interestingly, 
however, age, height, and weight are systematically correlated to education and 
occupation, while other physical traits that are not – such as eye colour and hair 
colour – are also not relevant to subjects’ dating decisions. Therefore, when proposing 
to a potential partner, female and male subjects use only partners’ physical attributes 
that are good signals of socioeconomic position. Second, there is positive sorting in 
dating preferences along a number of characteristics. Women and men prefer partners 
of similar age, height, and education [DiMaggio and Mohr 1985; Kurzban and 
Weeden 2005], while the evidence that people prefer partners of higher status [Mare 
1991] is very weak. We also find evidence of substantial heterogeneity in proposal 
behaviour across subjects’ and partners’ age, education, and occupation. 
Third, the impact of individual dating preferences is dwarfed by the part 
played by market opportunities that speed daters face. Of the estimated variation in 
attribute demand, preferences can explain as little as one percent along occupation, 
height, and smoking, and up to 30-40 percent along age and weight for male subjects 
and 45 percent along age among female subjects. The rest is explained by 
opportunities. This result emphasizes the notion that mating requires meeting: the 
pool of potential partners shapes the type of people to whom subjects propose and, 
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 Indeed, there is evidence that opportunities shape people’s life chances and decisions quite 
considerably. For instance, Keels et al. [2005] find that low-income black families who were moved 
into more affluent neighbourhoods are more likely to reside in high-income low-crime neighbourhoods 
even after 20 years since their initial placement. Similarly, the results in Marmaros and Sacerdote 
[2006] show that, although two white students interact three times more frequently than one white and 
one black student, placing white and black students in the same dorm increases their chances of 
interaction by a factor of three.  
8
 These findings are largely consistent with those emerged in the HurryDate study by Kurzban and 
Weeden [2005]. 
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ultimately, with whom they form long-term relationships [Kalmijn and Flap 2001].9 
Fourth, despite their lesser role, preferences do have a part when we observe a match, 
i.e., when two individuals propose to each other. On both sides of the market, we find 
evidence of a preference for partners with similar attributes, which magnifies the 
positive sorting emerged in dating demand and leads to greater levels of endogamy. 
But, differently from the way in which subjects express their dating demand with 
strong preferences for physical attributes, matches are predominantly driven by more 
pronounced preferences for socioeconomic similarity along attributes like age, 
education, and occupation.  
 
2. The Speed Dating Protocol  
Speed dating offers single individuals the opportunity to meet a large number of 
potential mates over a short pre-determined period of time. It has become very 
popular among dating intermediaries, with several commercial agencies organizing 
events in countries like the United States, Canada, Australia, Germany, France, and 
the United Kingdom.10  
We use data from one of the biggest UK private agencies that operates in 
small and large cities across the country. Participants register for an individual event 
that takes place in a specific location during the evening in a bar or club. Participants 
pay a fixed fee, which varies with location and occasional discounts. They also 
receive a “guarantee” that allows them to go back for free in case they did not propose 
to anyone.11 There is no specified maximum number of women and men who can 
participate in each session, although there are rarely more than 30 women and 30 
men. Events are stratified by age (23-35 and 35-50 are typical age ranges) so that 
individuals of roughly the same ages participate in the same session.12  
Bookings are made on the Internet or, less frequently, by phone. Individuals 
can book for an event as long as there are enough places available. The agency does 
not screen participants, nor does it intervene in the allocation of participants across 
                                                
9
 Of course, preferences for attributes which we cannot observe (e.g., ambition and intelligence) may 
still play a substantial role. 
10
 An updated list of agencies is available at 〈http://dmoz.org/Society/Relationships/Dating/ 
Speed_Dating〉.  
11
 Clearly, those who propose but do not get a match lose their guarantee. 
12
 The suggested age range is only a guideline and it is not binding; anyone is free to participate, even 
outside her/his age range. Events with asymmetric age ranges (e.g., women 27-40, men 28-42) are also 
run occasionally. They represent, however, a small proportion of the sessions contained in our dataset. 
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events. Hence, both composition and size of any given session are random in terms of 
participants’ attributes, conditional to the population of speed daters.  
Since sessions are run by local hosts, there might be some small variation in 
the protocol. In general, participants arrive for the event and, at registration, are given 
a starting table number, a label tag with a chosen film star alias, a pen and a card for 
indicating the alias of the people they wish to meet again (we shall refer to this choice 
as a proposal). Half an hour after registration, the host explains how the evening 
works, and then the session begins. People sit at the assigned table, with women 
usually staying seated at the same table and men moving around. Each date lasts for 
three minutes. After a date, men have about 30 seconds to move to the next table, and 
a new date begins. After eight individual dates the session stops, and participants can 
move around and get a quick drink from the bar before another round of eight three-
minute dates starts. A typical evening consists of three such rounds, after which 
participants can stay in the bar to chat to others or leave.     
Participants communicate their proposals to the agency right after the event. 
There is no limit to the number of proposals subjects can make from the pool of 
participants. In fact, each individual can be matched more than once. The agency 
collects all these proposals and exchanges contact details only between participants 
who have a match, i.e., those who propose to each other. In this environment, the cost 
of being rejected is arguably lower than in the standard day-to-day dating world. 
Proposals should therefore reflect true preferences.13  
Participants are recommended to create a personal profile on the agency’s 
website reporting information on age, education, occupation, basic physical 
characteristics (weight, height, eye colour, and hair colour), interests (hobbies and 
activities outside work), smoking habits, and family situation (presence of children). 
This information is self-reported and is not verified by the agency in any formal way. 
Profiles are accessible by all participants after the event only, and can be consulted 
before communicating the proposals. Some characteristics in the profile are 
presumably easier to verify than others. Because participants have personally met, 
they are likely to have a good idea of each other’s physical attributes. Thus, 
differently from other forms of mediated dating – such as small ads or on-line dating – 
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 Despite this, the interpretation of our estimates must rely on “straightforward” behaviour (as pointed 
out in Fisman et al. [2006a]). That is, we ought to assume that if a subject proposes to partner i and not 
to partner j, then the valuation that the subject has for i must be greater than her/his valuation for j.  
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the incentives to lie about characteristics that are easily verifiable are perhaps reduced. 
Conversely, other attributes – such as occupation and family circumstances – can be 
more easily disguised, and therefore information on them could be perceived as less 
reliable.  
 
3. Data Description 
We have data on approximately 1800 women and 1800 men who participated to 84 
speed dating events (or markets) organised between January 2004 and October 2005. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of these events. On average, an event gathers 
22.3 men and 22.3 women. Most events do not have exactly equal numbers of women 
and men, but the difference in numbers rarely goes beyond three.  
The participation fee across all markets is just below £20 per session (the 
median is £20), and ranges from £10 to £25. As mentioned earlier, participants who 
did not make any proposal are entitled to go back to a subsequent event for free. 
Indeed, 38 percent of men and 46 percent of women do not choose anyone, and three-
quarters of the non-proposing men and almost half of the non-proposing women in the 
sample go back another time.14  
Striking gender differentials in proposal behaviour are observed in the data. As 
emerged in many previous psychological studies [Trivers 1972], women are much 
choosier than men. On average, women choose 2.6 men and see 45 percent of their 
proposals matched, while men propose to 5 women and their proposals are matched in 
only 20 percent of the cases. About 36 percent of men and 11 percent of women do 
not get any proposal. Overall, we observe an average of 22 matches per event.  
To have a better understanding of speed daters’ characteristics, we compare 
them to a representative sample of singles taken from the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS).15 For this comparison, we use information from the fourteenth wave 
(2004) of the BHPS, and restrict the BHPS sample to individuals aged between 20 and 
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 In the analysis below, participants who speed date more than once are not treated differently from the 
others, apart from estimating subject specific fixed-effects models. In future work, we plan to look at 
the subgroups of those who go back and of non-proposing subjects more closely.  
15
 Since 1991, the BHPS has annually interviewed a representative sample of about 5500 households 
covering more than 10000 individuals. All adults and children in the first wave are designated as 
original sample members. On-going representativeness of the non-immigrant population has been 
maintained by using a ‘following rule’ typical of household panel surveys. At the second and 
subsequent waves (at approximately one-year intervals), all original sample members are followed and 
interviewed. There are interviews also with all the other adult members of the households containing 
either an original sample member or an individual born to an original sample member (whether or not 
they were members of the original sample). 
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50. The summary statistics by sample are reported in Table 2. The differences across 
samples are notable. Speed dating participants are more educated on average (about 
two thirds of men and women have at least a university degree, against 20 percent of 
singles in the BHPS), and are more concentrated in relatively high-skilled occupations 
(83 percent of men and 76 percent of women are in ‘skilled non-manual’ and 
‘professional and managerial’ jobs, as opposed to 40 percent in the BHPS). Our 
sample therefore fits the popular view about speed dating markets, according to which 
they seem to attract a disproportionate fraction of “career” people [Kurzban and 
Weeden 2005].  
Speed daters are also older than their BHPS counterparts (especially men, who 
are 5 years older on average). But if we restrict the BHPS sample to individuals with 
at least a university degree, the age differentials are reversed: male and female speed 
daters are 1 to 4 years younger, respectively. The average height is similar in both 
samples, slightly below 180 centimetres for men and around 165 centimetres for 
women.16 The average weight is comparable among men in the two samples, but it is 
much lower for female speed daters, and this difference does not disappear even if the 
BHPS sample is restricted to highly educated women. Dividing weight (measured in 
kilograms) by height squared (measured in metres), we obtain the Body Mass Index 
(BMI), which we include in our empirical analysis. General health guidelines 
associate ‘normal’ weight with a BMI between 18.5 and 25, and define ‘underweight’ 
when BMI is below 18.5 and ‘overweight’ when BMI is above 25. The shares of 
overweight men and, in particular, women are substantially larger in the BHPS 
sample than in the speed dating sample. The two sets of figures do not get closer even 
when the BHPS sample is restricted to more educated respondents.  
It is worthwhile noting that in the speed dating sample there are substantially 
fewer women reporting weight information than men. Our analysis will try to 
minimise the resulting loss in sample size by assigning participants with missing 
weight information to the (base) normal weight category and identifying them with a 
missing weight dummy variable. We shall proceed in a similar fashion for all the 
variables with missing information (except age, because we restrict the sample to 
                                                
16
 In some of the analysis presented in Section 4, we use differences in age and height between men and 
women. For example, we distinguish pairs in which the man is 7 centimetres taller from other pairs. 
Although this cutoff is arbitrary, 7 centimetres correspond to one standard deviation in the height 
distribution of married men and women aged 20-50 in the 2004 BHPS. Seven centimetres are also 
about half of the gender height difference among married couples. Similar considerations apply to the 
case of age, for which we distinguish men who are 5 or more years older than women. 
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individuals with valid age information). Alternative assignment rules (e.g., 
substituting missing values with market mean or modal values computed on valid 
cases) have delivered exactly identical results to those discussed below and are, 
therefore, not reported. However, we will discuss the estimates for the dummy 
variables that record missing information.  
Finally, smoking is more prevalent among BHPS respondents, with 36 percent 
of men and 38 women of women smoking against 9 and 13 percent respectively in the 
speed dating sample. Limiting this sample to highly educated participants does not 
eliminate the differences but reduces them by more than half. Speed daters may 
believe that smoking reduces their overall desirability and, consequently, are more 
likely to misreport this information. However, as it was also the case for other 
attributes, many of the observed differences with respect to the general BHPS 
population of singles seem to be driven by the fact that speed daters are relatively 
older, more educated, and employed in better jobs.  
Despite this sample selection issue,17 our analysis does not suffer from the 
“articulation effect” mentioned in Fisman et al. [2006a]. This emerges when subjects 
are asked to rate their partners on particular attributes at the same time as they propose 
to them. In such cases, it is possible that the proposal decision is affected by the 
reasoning on which the rating itself is determined. Because in our dataset subjects do 
not have to articulate reasons for a specific decision and are never asked to rate 
partners (other than choosing them), the results below should not be driven by reason-
based choice. 
 
4. The Role of Preferences  
4.1 Attribute Demands  
Our basic regression specification is of the form 
(1) ijmjmijmd εβα +′+= X , 
where ijmd  is the proposal decision that subject i takes with respect to partner j in 
market m. This is equal to one if i proposes to j, and zero otherwise. The vector jmX  
contains socio-demographic characteristics of potential partners in market m, and ijmε  
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 Concerns of sample selection also apply to all the other existing studies of speed dating experiments.  
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is an idiosyncratic shock. For ease of interpretation, we use a linear probability model 
and, because our observations are at the subject-partner pair level in each market, we 
also account for the potential correlation of observations within markets. Similar 
results were obtained with a probit model.18  
 The results, by gender, are shown in Table 3, columns (1) and (2).19 Men are 
more likely to receive proposals if they are young and tall, and women receive more 
proposals if they are young and slim. For example, an additional year of age reduces 
female desirability to men by 1 percentage point (which represents a 5 percent 
reduction in the male proposal rate, see column (2)) and male desirability to women 
by 0.4 percentage points (or 4 percent reduction in the female proposal rate, column 
(1)). On average, five extra centimetres (nearly one standard deviation increase in 
men’s height) will increase female proposals by almost 1 percentage point (a 9 
percent increase in female proposal rates). An overweight woman, instead, will see 
her chance to get a proposal reduced by about 16 percentage points (a 70 percent 
reduction). If a woman smokes, her likelihood of receiving a proposal is reduced by 
almost 5 percentage points. This holds for men too, although the effect is weaker and 
significant only at the 10 percent level. To the extent that smoking captures health-
related traits, these results therefore indicate that physically observable attributes tend 
to dominate the desirability of both men and women.  
Partner’s education and occupation play a minor direct role in shaping mate 
selection in this speed dating setting. Nonetheless, more educated women are almost 
10 percent more likely to receive a proposal than less educated women, although this 
effect is significant only at the 10 percent level. There is no evidence of a similar 
pattern on the other side of the market (i.e., in the case of women’s demand).20 
Although subjects’ demand is driven by partners’ physical attributes and not 
by their socioeconomic position directly, socioeconomic position may be correlated 
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 We also experimented with variants of equation (1) that account for subject fixed effects. The results 
obtained from these fixed-effects regressions were qualitatively identical to those discussed below and, 
thus, are not reported. 
19
 In the regression analysis below, we enter age (in years) and height (in centimetres) linearly, 
distinguish individuals with degree or higher qualifications, have three occupational dummies, and 
separate overweight people from the others. We have tried a number of other specifications (e.g., 
polynomials in age and height, and more dummies for occupation and BMI), but all our main results 
were unchanged.  
20
 As shown by the p-value of the ‘joint significance’ tests in Table 3, none of the indicators of missing 
information on partner’s traits is significant in the female proposal regressions. The likelihood of male 
proposals is only reduced by women not reporting information on their weight. Women who do not 
report their weight may be less desirable because they might be overweight.  
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with physical attributes. For female subjects, we find that height and weight are 
correlated with neither own education nor occupation, and age is negatively related 
only to higher educational attainment. For male subjects, instead, education is 
strongly positively correlated with both age and height. Regardless of gender, 
smoking is negatively associated with both education and occupation. When 
formulating their proposals, therefore, individuals (especially women) may be using 
partners’ desirable physical attributes, such as height, as strong signals of their 
socioeconomic position (see Steckel [1995] for a review of the literature on the 
connection between height and standard of living).   
Physical attributes may also be correlated with other traits, e.g., attractiveness 
and personality, which are not observed by us but can be seen by all participants and 
may drive the estimated pattern of proposals. To gauge these traits, we use the 
proposals to partner j made by all subjects other than i in any given market m 
averaged over all subjects in that meeting. We denote this by ijmd − , which can be seen 
as a measure of partner’s collective desirability or popularity. We then repeat the 
analysis after including ijmd−  in our regressions. The results, reported in columns (3) 
and (4) of Table 3, are similar to those found earlier. Thus, partners’ physical 
attributes still increase partners’ desirability, albeit to a lesser extent than before. But 
ijmd−  is a powerful predictor of demand. A one percent increase in this measure 
increases the likelihoods of female and male proposals by about 8 percentage points, 
which represent 70 and 35 percent increases in women’s and men’s proposal rates, 
respectively.  
We next consider the influence of subjects’ own characteristics on their 
demand for partners. Specifically, we examine whether subjects are more likely to 
select partners assortatively or choose partners with different attributes. The estimates 
on partners’ attributes, obtained from regressions that also controlled for popularity, 
are in columns (5) and (6) of Table 3, while the estimates on attribute differences or 
similarities are reported in Table 4. In Table 3, partner’s age and popularity are still 
strong predictors of female and male proposals, but the other characteristics have lost 
their direct influence on subject’s demand.21   
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 We also looked at the direct effect of subject’s own attributes on proposal behaviour. Both women 
and men are choosier (i.e., are less likely to propose) if they are older and more educated. We do not 
find any significant effect for the other attributes.  
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The results in Table 4 offer evidence of positive assortative matching, whether 
popularity is controlled for or not. As before, physical attributes are important. 
Women are less likely to propose to men who are shorter and to men who are either 
younger or more than 5 years older. Men too prefer women who are younger by no 
more than 5 years and shorter by no more than 7 centimetres, and they are less likely 
to propose if their potential partner is taller. Men who smoke prefer smokers, even 
though smoking is not seen as a desirable attribute by men. Partner’s desirability is 
now also determined by educational similarity. All subjects prefer partners with their 
own level of education to partners who are less educated than they are. In addition, 
both men and women tend to propose more to partners who are more educated, but 
this tendency is never statistically significant. When collective desirability is included 
(columns (3) and (4) of Table 4), we find that a woman is less likely to choose a man 
if he is more popular than she is, while a man is less likely to propose to a woman if 
she is less popular than he is. We should keep in mind that women are more attractive 
than men on average (because men choose more women), so it is maybe not the most 
appropriate thing to do to compare “absolute” attractiveness (i.e. comparing the 
attractiveness of men and women). Despite this gender asymmetry, there is strong 
evidence of positive sorting, with women only slightly disliking men who are less 
popular and men only slightly disliking women who are more popular.  
As emphasized in Section 2, speed dating proposals are not likely to be driven 
by strategic considerations (e.g., fear of rejection) because the speed dating protocol 
guarantees no direct personal feedback. We checked the robustness of our estimates to 
strategic concerns by re-estimating our regressions after including the partner’s 
decision as an additional control. The results of Tables 3 and 4 were unaffected by 
this inclusion.  
To attend a speed dating session, individuals must be single, but they may 
have children. Individuals with children may have worse dating opportunities than 
those without children. But the inclusion of a dummy variable, indicating whether a 
potential partner has one or more children, did not change any of our previous 
estimates. Furthermore, having a child does not affect female desirability to men, 
while it mildly increases male desirability to women.  
We also have information on individuals’ interest in seven activities (film and 
music, sports, arts, travelling, restaurants and bars, outdoor recreation, and other 
activities) with binary responses. For each activity, we constructed an indicator 
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variable that took value one if both subject and partner shared interest in that activity. 
We then summed these seven indicators up into one ‘common interests’ variable and 
used this in our regression analysis. We found that the common interests variable was 
never correlated with women’s proposals, but positively correlated with men’s 
proposals even after including female and male attributes. Such a correlation, 
however, disappears if we control for women’s collective desirability. The reason 
seems to be that shared interests (especially in sports and restaurants and bars) are 
strongly correlated with women’s popularity.   
Our data set contains information on other physical traits (such as eye and hair 
colour), which have not been used in our analysis so far. When we include partner’s 
eye and hair colour indicators in our regressions, the estimates in Tables 3 and 4 
remain broadly unchanged. However, for both men and women, these additional 
physical attributes are correlated neither with education nor with occupation. These 
findings tie in well with the notion that, when formulating their proposals, subjects 
use partners’ physical attributes as signals of socioeconomic position: physical traits 
that are not economically salient will not be used in subjects’ dating decision.   
4.2 Heterogeneous Responses 
It is possible that mate selection varies according to subjects’ observable 
characteristics. To some extent, these have been already accounted for in columns (5) 
and (6) of Table 3 and in Table 4. But to allow for this variation more fully, we look 
for heterogeneity in proposal behaviour by estimating models that distinguish subjects 
by age, education, and occupation.22 The results from these regressions are reported in 
Table 5. 
There is evidence of substantial heterogeneity. Younger female subjects prefer 
men who are younger, have higher educational qualifications, and are in non-manual 
jobs. Older women tend to choose men who are older, taller, have lower educational 
qualifications, and do not smoke. The preference for men with greater popularity 
observed in Table 3 is concentrated amongst younger women: for them, a one percent 
increase in males’ collective desirability nearly doubles their demand. For male 
subjects, the differences by age are comparable. Younger men are more likely to 
choose younger and more educated women, whereas older men prefer older, taller and 
                                                
22
 Subjects are defined to be ‘younger’ if they have 35 or fewer years of age, and ‘more educated’ if 
they have university or higher educational qualifications.  
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normal-weight partners. As in the case of women, younger men put a greater weight 
on women’s popularity than older men do.  
More educated male and female subjects have broadly similar proposal 
behaviours and prefer younger and more educated partners. In addition, more 
educated men prefer women who do not smoke, while more educated women prefer 
taller men. At the other end of the distribution, less educated men prefer partners who 
are not in manual (and other) occupations – one of the few indications of possible 
negative sorting – and who are not overweight, whereas less educated women are 
generally less picky over men’s attributes. More educated subjects are more sensitive 
to partners’ collective desirability than their less educated counterparts. 
Women in managerial and professional occupations are less likely to propose 
to men in manual occupations, while women in non-manual, manual and other 
occupations prefer men who are younger and men in manual (and other) occupations. 
Younger women are more likely to receive proposals by all men irrespective of their 
occupational position, whereas men in lower level occupations show a preference also 
for slim women, and men at the upper end of the occupational ladder are more likely 
to propose to non-smoking and more educated women. Regardless of gender, subjects 
in managerial and professional jobs put more weight on partner’s collective 
desirability than subjects in other occupations.  
A good deal of heterogeneity emerges also in subjects’ actual choices by age, 
education, and occupation. Younger and more educated men who are in managerial 
and professional occupations are 38 to 65 percent more likely to propose than their 
older, less educated, and in lower-level occupations counterparts. Similar differentials 
emerge among female subjects too. These differences, however, may arise not only 
because, say, less educated subjects are more selective, but also because the available 
pool of potential partners does not fit their preferences.23  
 
5. The Role of Opportunities 
5.1 Market Size  
                                                
23
 We also considered price and location of speed dating meetings as two additional sources of 
heterogeneity in subjects’ proposal behaviour. The results from this analysis (not shown for 
convenience) reveal that differences in price and location have little overall effect on subjects’s 
demand. That is, subjects’ behaviour in larger cities is not significantly different from the behaviour of 
subjects in smaller cities; likewise, the proposal patterns in more expensive markets mirror the patterns 
in cheaper markets. 
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The size of the group may affect both the number of proposals made by subjects and 
the degree of positive sorting. For example, women could be choosier in larger 
markets [Fisman et al. 2006a]. Alternatively, women in smaller and more 
homogeneous markets could choose partners with characteristics similar to theirs 
simply because they are exposed to very few partners with different attributes. 
 To check whether group size has a direct impact on mate selection, we take 
advantage of the random variation in group size in the sample, in which the number of 
participants per meeting varies between 15 and 31 on each side.24 We begin by 
estimating simple variants of regression (1), which include only the number of male 
and female participants in each session as regressors. Irrespective of the sex of the 
subjects, the likelihood of proposing is unaffected by the number of participants on 
either side of the market (i.e., partners or subjects) and by the total market size. The 
inclusion of market averages of other attributes (e.g., age, education, occupation, and 
height) does not alter this finding. Finally, we estimate the market-level effect of 
changing the number of participants (partners or subjects) on the share of proposals 
made by subjects in each market. We find a small effect on males’ behaviour: if the 
number of potential partners increases from ten to twenty, the fraction of proposals 
made by men increases by about 4 percent (p-value=0.113). Differently from the 
results shown in Fisman et al. [2006a], we find no impact on females’ proposals. 
Similarly, we find no effect of subjects’ group size on selectivity. Taken together, 
therefore, there is little evidence of any market size effect in our sample.  
5.2 The Composition of Partners’ and Subjects’ Characteristics 
The analysis in Section 4 has shown that individuals do have some intrinsic 
preferences for partners with specific attributes. Hence, the observed positive 
assortative mating may be partly explained by preferences. But to what extent does 
meeting potential partners with certain characteristics rather than others matter in 
dating behaviour? And are market opportunities more or less relevant than preferences 
in shaping demand?  
We address these questions taking advantage of the several speed dating 
sessions available in our data. Each session involves two pools of potential partners, 
all of whom are allocated randomly to that particular event. If market opportunities 
play a crucial role in dating, then there should be a close mapping between the 
                                                
24
 Group size varies not only across locations but also across events in the same location. 
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characteristics of all potential partners and the characteristics of the partners who 
receive a proposal. Suppose, for example, that subjects have no intrinsic preference 
for specific attributes, so that dating is entirely driven by meeting. In this case, the 
pattern of proposals should be determined by the pool of potential partners: for 
example, the share of proposals received by highly educated people in a given speed 
dating session should be equal to the share of highly educated people in that session. 
More formally, we contrast the observed mean (or share) of a given attribute (e.g., 
age) computed over all partners in a given meeting m, ,jmX  with the average age of 
the partners who have been chosen, .)(cjmX  If subjects do not have a systematic 
preference for, say, younger partners but choose at random, this conditional mean 
should be identical to the overall market mean, i.e., .)( jm
c
jm XX =  We therefore can 
infer how opportunities and preferences interact from market-level regressions of the 
form: 
(2) mjmcjm XX εαα ++= 10)( , 
where 0α  measures the extent to which partners with a particular attribute attract a 
disproportionate share of proposals from subjects in all markets, and 1α  measures the 
sensitivity of proposals to a change in the share of partners with a specific attribute. If 
00 =α  and 11 =α  for a given ,X  preferences do not matter in the sense that subjects 
do not put weight on X and its market distribution is fully reflected in subjects’ 
proposals. If  00 ≠α  and/or ,11 ≠α  then both preferences and markets matter.
25
 A 
value of  0α  other than zero reflects the systematic preference of subjects in all 
meetings for a specific trait. Even if ,00 =α  there is a role for preferences: estimates 
of 11 >α  (or )10 1 << α  indicate that as the share of partners with a given attribute 
increases in the market, the share of partners who receive a proposal increases more 
(or less) than proportionally.  
For each of the attributes used so far, the results by subject’s gender from 
regressions (2) are reported in Table 6, panel A.26 To ease interpretation, these are 
complemented by Figures 1 and 2. As our earlier analysis shows, women and men in 
                                                
25
 In this formulation, markets do not matter only in the limit case of α1=0. 
26
 In order to limit the influence of missing data, shares or means in equation (2) were computed only 
on partners for whom we have valid information on each specific attribute. 
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all markets prefer younger partners on average ,0( 0 <α  column (1)), although this 
preference becomes weaker as we move to markets in which partner’s average age 
increases (this is because 1α  is always significantly greater than 1). Other 
characteristics along which both preferences and markets have an influence on dating 
decisions are smoking in the case of female proposals and education and weight in the 
case of male proposals. More educated female partners are more desirable on average 
),0( 0 >α but tend to attract fewer proposals in markets where more of them are 
available ).1( 1 <α  Similarly, a greater availability of overweight women does not 
sway male preferences towards them. These findings confirm the estimates discussed 
in Section 4 and also allow us to give them a deeper interpretation.  
There are also attributes for which the observed individual decisions seem to 
be driven mainly by market conditions. These are occupation and height both for 
women and men, weight and education in the case of female proposals, and smoking 
in the case of male proposals. In such instances, the intercept is always equal to zero, 
and the slope parameter is never statistically different from 1. Thus, for example, 
subjects tend to select more professional partners if they are in markets with a greater 
share of professionals, while they propose more to low-level occupation partners in 
meetings where the share of professionals is small. Interestingly, some of these 
attributes – such as occupation, weight, and education for female subjects – have little 
direct effect on individual demands (see the results of Section 4). These estimates 
indicate that opportunities may play a key part in shaping mate selection in our 
sample: in this sense, therefore, anyone can be “the” one.   
Of course, proposals are likely to be affected not only by the distribution of 
partners’ characteristics but also by market conditions on the subjects’ side. For 
example, highly educated partners may receive a larger share of proposals in markets 
with a greater concentration of highly educated subjects; and, conversely, they may 
receive a smaller share of proposals when the pool of subjects is relatively less 
educated. To explore this possibility, we analyze a relationship similar to equation (2), 
in which, on the right-hand side, we replace jmX  with ,imX  the observed mean (or 
share) of a given attribute computed over all subjects (and not partners) in a given 
meeting m. That is, 
(3) mimcjm XX ηββ ++= 10)( . 
 18 
The parameter of interest here is .1β 27 If ,01 =β  then the distribution of subjects 
along one specific attribute and the distribution of selected partners along the same 
attribute in a given meeting are unrelated. In other words, subjects’ proposal 
behaviour is independent of subjects’ characteristics and is shaped largely by market 
conditions.  
   The results are in Table 6, panel B. Except in the cases of age and smoking,28 
the distribution of subjects’ attributes turns out to be independent of subjects’ 
demands. Thus, subjects do not become more or less selective as the distributions of 
their attributes vary; they propose to whoever happens to be on the other side of the 
market. As an additional check, we also estimated regressions in which the 
specification of the right-hand side is the same as that of equation (2) but the 
dependent variable is the mean (or share) of a given attribute computed over subjects 
(rather than partners). The results of these regressions (not shown for brevity) are 
qualitatively identical to those of panel B in Table 6.  
5.3 Opportunities or Preferences? 
The estimates presented in the previous section and in this so far show that both 
preferences and opportunities affect the observed patterns of choice. One way to 
gauge the relative importance of these two factors is to extend the analysis performed 
in subsection 5.2 to the subject (rather than the market) level. In particular, employing 
the notation used in equation (2), we examine whether there is a systematic 
relationship between jmX  and the attribute mean (or share) computed over the 
partners that subject i has proposed to, .)(cijmX  We also try to capture the importance of 
sorting – one channel through which preferences seem to play a part in the analysis 
shown in Section 4 – by including the subject’s attribute, .imX  Thus, for each subject 
in our sample, we estimate 
(4)  iimjmcijm uXXX +++= 210)( γγγ . 
The estimates of (4) – like those of equations (2) and (3) – will reflect both 
preferences and opportunities. But, if 020 == γγ  and 11 =γ , then subjects’ proposals 
                                                
27
 Clearly β0 reflects subjects’ intrinsic preferences for a specific attribute. Because this issue has been 
addressed in Section 4, however, the estimates of β0 are not presented. 
28
 The age result – i.e., the fact that subjects’ average age is higher in relatively older markets – is not 
surprising given that meetings are stratified by age. 
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primarily reflect partners’ availability. We therefore determine the role of 
opportunities (net of preferences) by decomposing the total 2R  of model (4) into two 
components: the first comes from the constrained model that sets 0γ  and 2γ  to zero 
and 1γ  to 1, and captures the role of opportunities; while the second is just the residual 
part which can be attributed to preferences. For the sake of brevity, the estimates of 
such regressions are not presented, but they confirm our previous main findings.  
Table 7 reports the fractions of 2R  that can be separately attributed to 
preferences and opportunities as well as the total 2R  obtained from estimating (4) for 
each of the usual characteristics. These results are quite striking. Male preferences 
over occupation, height, and smoking play hardly any part in determining men’s 
demand for partners, explaining less than 1 percent of the observed variation in their 
choice patterns. Women’s preferences over occupation are equally inconsequential, 
while female preferences for non smokers, more educated, non-overweight, and taller 
men account for 2 to 6 percent of the explained variation in demand. The most 
substantial influence of female preferences emerges along the age attribute, where the 
preference for a younger partner can account for about 46 percent of the .2R  Male 
preferences for better educated partners can explain only 6 percent of the estimated 
variation in demand, with the remaining 94 percent being driven by market 
conditions. Preferences for younger and normal-weight women affect mate selection 
more significantly, by explaining demand patters between 30 and 40 percent. Along 
all attributes, therefore, the role of opportunities in shaping mate selection is 
considerable.  
These findings are largely consistent with the results on preferences discussed 
in Section 4 as well as with the results on market availability and characteristics 
discussed in the previous part of this section. They provide strong evidence of the 
importance of the environment in which individuals meet and choose each other.  
Thus, over and above the effect of individual preferences, highly homogenous 
markets will tend to generate more endogamous couples and an overall greater extent 
of segregation along all observed attributes, while heterogeneous markets will 
produce more heterogamous couples. Of course, our interpretation should also take 
account of the unusual composition of the sample. As already mentioned, the 
relatively muted impact of preferences could be due to the fact that speed daters may 
have no intrinsic preferences for specific attributes. Our sample, indeed, may be 
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unusual, in the sense that speed daters are older, more educated, in higher-level 
occupations, and less likely to smoke than their general population counterparts. 
These features combined with the fact that speed daters are not (or should not be) in a 
long-term relationship indicate that subjects in our sample may be less likely to search 
for partners who have attributes identical to theirs or could have no strong preferences 
at all.   
In any case, despite the huge effect of market conditions, preferences could 
reinforce or undo the outcome produced by opportunities alone depending on whether 
individuals match assortatively or not. As shown in Section 4, people do match 
positively on a number of attributes, whereby greater levels of endogamy and 
segregation are expected to emerge among matched pairs. This is the issue to which 
we now turn more closely.  
5.4 Sorting and Matching 
Do preferences play a role when we observe a match (that is, when two people 
propose to each other)? Might they magnify or offset the influence of market 
opportunities? We analyze these questions by computing separate odds ratios for all 
the female-male pairs in our sample and for those for whom we observe a match.29 
The analysis in Section 4 reveals that there is some positive sorting in attribute 
demand. Thus, if preferences are at work, we expect the odds ratios of matched pairs 
to be greater than the odds ratios of all (matched and unmatched) pairs, suggesting 
that a preference for partners with similar attributes will lead to greater levels of 
endogamy.  
The results in Table 8 substantiate our expectation. The odds ratios for 
matched pairs (column (1)) are larger than the odds ratios for all pairs (column (2)) 
along all attributes, except in the case of overweight.30 Evidence of such increases is 
strongest along education, occupation, smoking and, especially, age. This finding is 
interesting: the estimates in Section 4 reveal that dating proposals are predominantly 
determined by physical attributes, although these turn out to be correlated to 
                                                
29
 Odds ratios are an appealing measure of endogamy because they provide a simple reference point: 
odds ratios greater than unity indicate that there is more endogamy than one would expect if individuals 
matched at random. Moreover, odds ratios allow us to compare endogamy across attributes or groups 
because they are independent of the relative size of the groups under considerations. For a more 
detailed description, see Goodman [1979].  
30
 It is worth noting that, albeit significantly different from one along most attributes, the odds ratios in 
column (1) are just above unity, confirming that the distributions of characteristics among subjects and 
partners in the sample are fairly random. 
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socioeconomic characteristics; matches, instead, are driven by more pronounced 
preferences for socioeconomic similarity. Despite the fact that the odds ratios in 
column (2) are much lower than those generally found for individuals in final matches 
(e.g., Kalmijn [1994] and Pencavel [1998]), they reveal how preferences operate, and 
are also quite remarkable given that speed daters have just three minutes in which to 
make their judgements.   
 
6. Conclusions 
Our paper analyzes mate selection using data from a large UK speed dating agency. 
We take advantage of the experimental design of the data that allow us to observe the 
behaviour of large numbers of women and men in several speed dating meetings. 
Both women and men put comparable weights on observable physical attributes: 
women prefer men who are young and tall, while men are more attracted to women 
who are young and thin. Interestingly, age, height, and weight are correlated to 
education and occupation, while other physical traits that are not – such as eye colour 
and hair colour – are also not relevant to subjects’ dating decisions. Therefore, when 
proposing to a potential partner, female and male subjects only use partners’ physical 
attributes that are good predictors of socioeconomic status. We also find evidence of 
positive sorting along a number of characteristics (with both women and men 
preferring partners of similar age, height, and education) and substantial heterogeneity 
in behaviour across subjects’ and partners’ age, education, and occupation. But the 
role of individual preferences is overshadowed by that of market opportunities. Of the 
estimated variation in attribute demand, preferences can explain as little as one 
percent along occupation, height, and smoking, and up to 30-40 percent along age and 
weight for male subjects and 45 percent along age among female subjects. The rest is 
explained by opportunities. But despite this, preferences have a part when we observe 
a match, i.e., when two individuals propose to one another. Matches are driven by 
more pronounced preferences for socioeconomic similarity along attributes like age, 
education, and occupation.  
 This work contributes to the growing literature in economics that emphasizes 
the importance of studying mate selection and estimating preferences over partner 
attributes. A number of extensions and improvements would be desirable. First, 
incorporating how speed daters learn about their potential partners’ characteristics 
(either during the meeting or browsing their profiles) would give us a deeper 
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understanding of dating preferences, which may also have ramifications for theory. 
Second, a similar methodology could be used to analyze different substantive issues 
(such as the extent to which dating preferences differ by ethnicity), different rules of 
the game (e.g., allowing participants to interact for more than three minutes or 
eliminating the guarantee when they do not propose to anyone), different agencies that 
target diverse populations (in terms of age, occupation, race, or religion) and speed 
daters in different countries. Finally, an ambitious extension is to follow speed daters 
over time and observe how their matches evolve: this will allow us to have a better 
view on how they screen potential partners and eventually form durable long-term 
relationships. 
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Table 1 
Sample Characteristics of Speed Dating Events 
 
 Mean  Std. dev. Min Max 
     
Number of female subjects (Nm = 84) 22.3 3.9 15 31 
     Number of male subjects (Nm = 84) 22.3 3.9 15 30 
     Number of proposals made per 
meeting by: 
    
Female subjects (Ni = 1868) 2.6 3.1 0 30 
Male subjects (Ni = 1870) 5.0 5.8 0 29 
     Number of proposals received per 
meeting by: 
    
Male partners (Nj = 1870) 2.6 3.1 0 18 
Female partners (Nj = 1868) 5.0 4.4 0 22 
     Number of matches per meeting 22 20 2 117 
     Share of proposals matched (as a 
fraction of all proposals) for: 
 
 
   
Female subjects (Obs = 4530) 0.45    
Male subjects (Obs = 10107) 0.20    
     
Nm is the number of events (or markets), Ni is the number of subjects, Nj is the number of partners, and 
‘Obs’ refers to the number of subject-partner pairs in which the subject has made a proposal. 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics of Subjects’ Attributes 
 
 Men  Women 
 Speed dating BHPS  Speed dating BHPS 
      
Age (years) 35.8 (6.9) 
[1,828] 
30.5 (9.1) 
[1,200] 
 34.5 (7.5) 
[1,776] 
32.7 (9.4) 
[1,351] 
      University degree or more  0.65 
[1071] 
0.20 
[1053] 
 0.66 
[974] 
0.20 
[1248] 
      Occupation      
      Professional and managerial 0.43 0.24  0.36 0.33 
Skilled non manual 0.40 0.16  0.50 0.19 
Other occupationsa  0.17 
[1105] 
0.60 
[905] 
 0.14 
[1008] 
0.48 
[862] 
      Height (cm) 179.1 (6.9) 
[1134] 
178.4 (7.4) 
[1095] 
 165.4 (6.7) 
[1008] 
163.8 (6.4) 
[1270] 
      Weight (kg) 77.6 (10.0) 
 [783] 
79.9 (15.5) 
[1067] 
 57.8 (5.9) 
 [334] 
66.4 (14.0) 
[1192] 
      Share underweightb 0.00 0.02  0.05 0.04 
Share overweightc 0.30 0.45  0.05 0.38 
      Smoking 0.09 
[1059] 
0.36 
[1101] 
 0.13 
[844] 
0.38 
[1278] 
      
Standard deviations in parentheses, and number of subjects in square brackets.  
a
 Includes workers in manual occupations, self-employed, full-time students, and individuals in other jobs.  
b
 If BMI<18.5. 
c
 If BMI>25.  
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Table 3  
Demand for Partner’s Attributes 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Age (years) -0.004** 
(0.0009) 
-0.010** 
(0.001) 
-0.001** 
(0.0002) 
-0.002** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0012** 
(0.0005) 
-0.005** 
(0.001) 
       University degree or more 0.003 
(0.010) 
0.021 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.022 
(0.012) 
-0.031 
(0.018) 
       Skilled non-manual 0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.012) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.0002 
(0.003) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.0004 
(0.008) 
       Other occupations 0.005 
(0.016) 
-0.014 
(0.018) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
       Height (cm) 0.002** 
(0.0006) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.00036* 
(0.00015) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001 
(0.0003) 
0.0003 
(0.004) 
       Overweight 0.0001 
(0.009) 
-0.155** 
(0.028) 
-0.0002 
(0.002) 
-0.039** 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.013 
(0.011) 
       Smoking -0.019 
(0.012) 
-0.047** 
(0.014) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.012** 
(0.004) 
-0.007 
(0.022) 
-0.048 
(0.038) 
       Collective desirability   0.799** 
(0.025) 
0.777** 
(0.025) 
0.887** 
(0.033) 
0.777** 
(0.026) 
       Joint significance of missing 
partner’s information (p-value) 
0.082 0.090 0.159 0.114 0.143 0.126 
Joint significance of missing 
subject’s information (p-value) 
    0.085 0.113 
Joint significance of all missing 
information variables (p-value) 
    0.091 0.097 
       R2 0.017 0.042 0.111 0.125 0.138 0.181 
Mean dependent variable 0.113 0.222 0.113    0.222    0.113 0.222 
       Observations 41782 40544 41782 40544 41782 40544 
       Subject’s gender Female Male Female Male Female Male 
       
Linear probability model; robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by market. The level of observation is a male-female  
meeting. Other variables included in all regressions are dummy variables recording missing partner’s information on education,  
occupation, height, weight, and smoking. In addition, the regressions reported in columns (5) and (6) contain the missing  
information dummy variables for the subject.  
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent. 
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Table 4 
Effect of Partner-Subject Similarity on Proposal Behaviour  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Man is 5+ years older -0.048** 
(0.011) 
-0.117** 
(0.015) 
-0.034** 
(0.006) 
-0.105** 
(0.011) 
     Woman is older -0.058** 
(0.013) 
-0.049* 
(0.020) 
-0.040** 
(0.011) 
-0.023* 
(0.011) 
     Man is more educated 0.010 
(0.015) 
-0.064** 
(0.018) 
0.012 
(0.014) 
-0.057** 
(0.017) 
     Woman is more educated -0.041** 
(0.012) 
0.023 
(0.020) 
-0.039** 
(0.011) 
0.024 
(0.019) 
     Both are in professional/ managerial 
occupations 
0.008 
(0.019) 
0.001 
(0.019) 
0.011 
(0.017) 
0.0003 
(0.018) 
     Both are in skilled non-manual 
occupations 
-0.013 
(0.014) 
-0.005 
(0.015) 
-0.010 
(0.014) 
-0.007 
(0.015) 
     Both are in other occupations 0.052 
(0.036) 
0.046 
(0.032) 
0.037 
(0.030) 
0.027 
(0.030) 
     Man is 7+ cm taller 0.021 
(0.011) 
-0.035* 
(0.017) 
0.016 
(0.010) 
-0.036* 
(0.016) 
     Woman is taller -0.043** 
(0.013) 
-0.086** 
(0.020) 
-0.026** 
(0.009) 
-0.070** 
(0.013) 
     Both are overweight 0.093 
(0.081) 
-0.099** 
(0.029) 
0.103 
(0.073) 
-0.077* 
(0.038) 
     Both smoke 0.027 
(0.033) 
0.118* 
(0.050) 
0.012 
(0.035) 
0.117* 
(0.047) 
     Both are not smoking -0.0004 
(0.023) 
-0.034 
(0.038) 
0.001 
(0.022) 
-0.033 
(0.038) 
     Man is more popular   -0.053** 
(0.010) 
-0.029** 
(0.010) 
     Woman is more popular   -0.012 
(0.007) 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
     R2 0.041 0.096 0.138 0.181 
Observations 41782 40544 41782 40544 
     Subject’s gender Female Male Female Male 
     
Linear probability model; robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by market. The level of observation  
is a male-female meeting. Other variables included in all regressions are dummy variables recording missing  
partner’s and subject’s information on education, occupation, height, weight, and smoking. The estimates on  
these variables for the specifications in columns (3) and (4) are reported in Table 3, columns (5) and (6) 
respectively. 
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent. 
 
 
 29 
Table 5 
Heterogeneity in Attribute Demand  
 
 Subject’s type  
 
 
Subject’s gender and  
partner’s attributes 
Younger Older More 
educated 
Less 
educated 
Professional 
and 
managerial 
occupations 
All other 
occupations 
       
Female       
Age -0.002** 
(0.0005) 
0.003** 
(0.0009) 
-0.002** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.0016 
(0.001) 
-0.001* 
(0.0004) 
University degree or more 0.011* 
(0.005) 
-0.017** 
(0.006) 
0.016* 
(0.008) 
-0.008* 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
-0.0003 
(0.003) 
Skilled non-manual 0.007* 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
Other occupations 0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.036** 
(0.011) 
0.010* 
(0.005) 
Height  -0.00001 
(0.0003) 
0.010** 
(0.0003) 
0.001** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.0008 
(0.0006) 
0.0003 
(0.0002) 
Overweight -0.002 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.016 
(0.017) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
Smoking -0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.019* 
(0.009) 
-0.016 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.023 
(0.014) 
-0.0005 
(0.005) 
Collective desirability 0.970** 
(0.062) 
0.573** 
(0.074) 
1.067** 
(0.087) 
0.687** 
(0.040) 
0.981** 
(0.100) 
0.765** 
(0.030) 
       R2 0.147 0.073 0.158 0.092 0.135 0.107 
Mean of dependent var. 0.138 0.081 0.139 0.099 0.141 0.106 
Observations 23135 18647 27266 14516 8024 33758 
       
Male       
Age -0.005** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.0009) 
-0.004** 
(0.0007) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
University degree or more 0.019* 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
0.025** 
(0.008) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
0.028* 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
Skilled non-manual 0.008 
(0.008) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
0.0002 
(0.012) 
0.00002 
(0.005) 
Other occupations 0.010 
(0.011) 
-0.012 
(0.012) 
0.015 
(0.013) 
-0.018* 
(0.008) 
-0.012 
(0.020) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
Height  -0.0004 
(0.0005) 
0.0009 
(0.0005) 
0.0001 
(0.0005) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0003 
(0.0008) 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
Overweight -0.019 
(0.017) 
-0.031 
(0.017) 
-0.039 
(0.032) 
-0.034* 
(0.016) 
-0.012 
(0.058) 
-0.045** 
(0.015) 
Smoking -0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.016 
(0.010) 
-0.021* 
(0.010) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
-0.043** 
(0.014) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
Collective desirability 0.901** 
(0.042) 
0.660** 
(0.060) 
0.984** 
(0.036) 
0.660** 
(0.050) 
0.992** 
(0.051) 
0.711** 
(0.040) 
       R2 0.167 0.088 0.183 0.092 0.176 0.109 
Mean of dependent var.  0.278 0.168 0.274 0.188 0.278 0.203 
Observations 19881 20663 24572 15792 10625 29919 
       
Linear probability model; robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by market. The level of observation is a  
male-female meeting. Other variables included in all regressions are dummy variables recording missing partner’s  
information on education, occupation, height, weight, and smoking. A subject is ‘younger’ if she/he has 35 or fewer  
years of age, and ‘more educated’ if she/he has university or higher educational qualifications. ‘All other occupations’ 
include skilled non-manual and other occupations (manual occupations, self-employed, full-time students,  
and individuals in other jobs).   
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent. 
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Table 6 
Mate Selection and the Distribution of Partner/Subject Attributes  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
Age 
(mean) 
(2) 
University 
degree or 
greater 
qualification 
(3) 
Professional 
and 
managerial 
occupations 
(4) 
Height 
(mean) 
(5) 
Overweight 
(6) 
Smoking 
       A. Partner’s attributes      
       Female subject       
0α  -8.75** (1.87) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
-8.75 
(17.63) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
1α  1.18** (0.05) 
1.11** 
(0.09) 
1.03** 
(0.13) 
1.05** 
(0.10) 
1.16** 
(0.11) 
1.30** 
(0.10) 
F test )1( 1 =α  0.001† 0.268 0.806 0.636 0.158 0.005† 
       R2 0.864 0.633 0.433 0.585 0.587 0.657 
Observations 84 81 81 82 81 84 
       Male subject       
0α  -7.34** (1.56) 
0.10* 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
7.18 
(10.47) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
1α  1.13** (0.04) 
0.90** 
(0.06) 
0.94** 
(0.07) 
0.96** 
(0.06) 
0.60** 
(0.04) 
1.09** 
(0.07) 
F test )1( 1 =α  0.005† 0.085 0.388 0.509 0.000† 0.202 
       R2 0.886 0.762 0.717 0.737 0.787 0.729 
Observations 84 84 78 84 80 84 
       
B. Subject’s attributes      
       Female subject       
1β  0.88** (0.07) 
0.10 
(0.14) 
-0.09 
(0.10) 
0.11 
(0.12) 
0.09 
(0.05) 
0.10* 
(0.05) 
       R2 0.647 0.012 0.009 0.010 0.042 0.042 
Observations 84 83 82 82 79 82 
       Male subject       
1β  1.13** (0.08) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.11) 
0.10 
(0.15) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
       R2 0.704 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.003 
Observations 84 83 82 82 79 82 
       
Ordinary least squares estimates; standard errors in parentheses. Figures in panel A are obtained from the estimation 
of equation (2); those in panel B are from equation (3) which includes a constant (see text). Observations are at the 
meeting level. In the rows labelled ‘F test’, we report the p-value of the test that α1=1. 
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent. 
† indicates that equality is rejected (at 1 percent).  
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Table 7 
Relative Importance of Subject’s Preferences and Market Opportunities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
Age  
(2) 
University 
degree or 
greater 
qualification 
(3) 
Professional 
and 
managerial 
occupations 
(4) 
Height  
(5) 
Overweight 
(6) 
Smoking 
       
Female subject       
       Fraction of R2 due 
to preferences 
0.315 
[0.457] 
0.006 
[0.023] 
0.0004 
[0.004] 
0.006 
[0.058] 
0.018 
[0.052] 
0.004 
[0.020] 
       Fraction of R2 due 
to opportunities  
0.375 
[0.543] 
0.251 
[0.977] 
0.098 
[0.996] 
0.099 
[0.942] 
0.336 
[0.948] 
0.177 
[0.980] 
       R2  0.690 0.257 0.098 0.105 0.354 0.181 
       
Male subject       
       Fraction of R2 due 
to preferences 
0.157 
[0.287] 
0.018 
[0.062] 
0.002 
[0.007] 
0.003 
[0.009] 
0.069 
[0.394] 
0.001 
[0.005] 
       Fraction of R2 due 
to opportunities  
0.389 
[0.713] 
0.273 
[0.938] 
0.286 
[0.993] 
0.272 
[0.991] 
0.107 
[0.606] 
0.249 
[0.995] 
       R2  0.546 0.291 0.288 0.275 0.176 0.250 
       
Figures are derived from the OLS estimation of equation (4) for each partner’s attribute and from constrained 
regressions in which γ0=γ2=0 and γ1=1. The corresponding percentage of the explained R2 is in square brackets.  
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Table 8 
Endogamy among All Pairs and Among Matched Pairs 
 
 (1) 
All speed daters 
(2) 
Matched only 
(3) 
Test of equality 
(p-value) 
    
Agea 2.39** 
(0.03) 
11.01** 
(0.97) 
0.000 
    University degree or greater qualification 1.10** 
(0.03) 
1.34** 
(0.13) 
0.010 
    Professional and managerial occupations 1.01 
(0.02) 
1.25* 
(0.12) 
0.013 
    Heighta 1.06* 
(0.03) 
1.08 
(0.09) 
0.933 
    Overweight 1.29* 
(0.16) 
0.69 
(0.76) 
0.421 
    Smoking 1.18* 
(0.08) 
1.81* 
(0.41) 
0.059 
    
The figures in the first two columns are odds ratios obtained from logistic regressions. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. In the column labelled ‘Test of equality’ we report the p-value of the test that the odds ratio in first 
column equals the corresponding odds ratio in the second column. 
a
 Figures are computed using two distinct groups, that is, individuals who are above the average age or height, and 
individuals who are at the average or below.  
* significantly different from 1 at the 5 percent level; ** significantly different from 1 at the 1 percent level. 
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Figure 1 
Mate selection and partners’ supply – Female subjects  
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Each dot represents means or shares of characteristics of partners in a specific meeting. The straight line is the 
45 degree line.  
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Figure 2 
Mate selection and partners’ supply – Male subjects  
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Each dot represents means or shares of characteristics of partners in a specific meeting. The straight line is the 
45 degree line.  
 
